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Economic Reform, Education Expansion, and 
Earnings Inequality for Urban Males in China, 1988-2007 
 
In the past 20 years the average real earnings of Chinese urban male workers have 
increased by 350 per cent. Accompanying this unprecedented growth is a considerable 
increase in earnings inequality. Between 1988 and 2007 the variance of log earnings 
increased from 0.27 to 0.48, a 78 per cent increase. Using a unique set of repeated cross-
sectional data this paper examines the causes of this increase in earnings inequality. We find 
that the major changes occurred in the 1990s when the labour market moved from a centrally 
planned system to a market oriented system. The decomposition exercise conducted in the 
paper identifies the factor that drives the significant increase in the earnings variance in the 
1990s to be an increase in the within-education-experience cell residual variances. Such an 
increase may be explained mainly by the increase in the price of unobserved skills. When an 
economy shifts from an administratively determined wage system to a market-oriented one, 
rewards to both observed and unobserved skills increase. The turn of the century saw a 
slowing down of the reward to both the observed and unobserved skills, due largely to the 
college expansion program that occurred at the end of the 1990s. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Over the past 20 years China has had unprecedented economic growth. In 1988, China’s per
capita GDP averaged $377, and by 2007 this value had increased almost sevenfold to $2604
(United Nation data series). This same period has also seen considerable institutional changes
in an economy which switched from a centrally-planned to a market-oriented system; a large
scale rural to urban migration; and a huge expansion in high education enrollment. In 1988
around 98 per cent of the urban labour force worked either in the state or the collective sectors,
only 10 per cent of the urban labour force had a college or above degree, and rural to urban
migration was almost non-existent. By 2007, employment in the state or collective sectors had
dropped by 36 percentage points to 63 per cent, labour force with tertiary and above education1
increased by 30 percentage points, while around 140 million rural labour force (accounting for
one third of the urban labour force) moved to cities to work. We would expect institutional
and structural changes of this magnitude should have a signiﬁcant impact on the distribution
of the earnings of local urban workers.
This paper sets out to document and investigate the impact of these changes on the changes
in urban male workers’2 earnings dispersion. Using a unique set of repeated cross-sectional
data we show that the last 20 years has seen the variance of the log male annual earnings in
urban China almost doubling. Unlike the earnings growth, however, the changes in earnings
dispersion have been more erratic. There was hardly any change in earnings inequality in the
period between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, but the variance of the log earnings increased
from 0.23 in 1992 to 0.47 in 2001. Since then, the increase in earnings inequality has been slow,
up until 2007.
This paper contributes to the literature by linking the changes in earnings inequality with
the measurable structural and institutional changes occurring during the same period. We show
1In the Chinese case, this includes individuals with 3-year college and above education.
2‘Urban’ in here has a special meaning related to the household registration system in China. Since the
early 1950s, China implemented a household registration system, whereby individuals born in a city are given an
‘urban’ household registration, and those who were born in countryside are given a ‘rural’ household registration.
Such a system has not changed for the past 60 years in that individuals who were born to parents with ‘rural’
household registration are still given a‘ r u r a l ’h o u s e h o l dr e g i s t r a t i o ne v e nt hough he/she might work in cities. In
this paper we use the term ‘urban workers’ to refer to workers who have ‘urban’ household registration.
1that part of this signiﬁcant increase in earnings inequality can be explained by the switching of
the urban labour force from the state/collective to the private sectors and part of it is due to
the increase in the return to education, and the reduction of the return to seniority. However,
for the most part, the changes are related to the signiﬁcant changes in within-group residual
variances.
The second contribution of this paper is that we examine the factors which might have
aﬀected the changes in within-group residual variances. The literature has always assumed
that the change in the within-group residual variances is driven by the change in the price for
unobserved skills while the distribution of unobserved skills is held constant over time (see, for
example, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1993 and Lemieux, 2002 and 2006). We ﬁnd that in China
it is impossible to argue that the distribution of unobservable skills has not changed, even within
the skill cells. In fact we ﬁnd that although the changes in the within-group residual variances in
the 1990s might be closely related to the increase in the price for unobserved skills, the slowing
down of the increase in within-group residual inequality in the 2000s may be mainly aﬀected
by a signiﬁcant increase in the supply of young educated workers. This not only suppressed
the price for observed and unobserved skills, but also changed the distribution of within-group
unobserved skills.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents background information on
factors aﬀecting earnings inequality, such as changes in labour market institutions and supply
of and demand for skilled and unskilled labour during this period. Section 3 introduces the data
used and describes changes in earnings inequality during the period. Section 4 discusses the
methodology. Section 5 investigates the changing pattern of earnings inequality and the main
contributing factors to the changes in inequality. Section 6 examines the causes ofs the change
in the contribution of the within-group residual variances. Conclusions are given in Section 7.
2B a c k g r o u n d
Under the planned economic regime, urban workers had lifetime employment whereby their
jobs were assigned by the state, ﬁrms were not allowed to ﬁre workers, and wage levels were
2centrally determined. The market oriented economic reform which began in the agricultural
sector at the end of the 1970s took a long time to spread to the urban sector. By the end of the
1980s, although some progress in marketization was made in the goods market, the urban labour
market reform lagged behind. Neither job mobility nor wage determination had changed much
from the planned economic regime, except that enterprises had the right to retain a proportion
of their proﬁts which were often used to pay bonuses to workers (Korzec, 1992; White, 1988;
Takahara, 1992 and Meng, 2000).
The early 1990s saw the speed-up of marketization in the goods market and an increase in
the dispersion of proﬁtability within the state sector. Studies ﬁnd that in the early 1990s wage
variations depended heavily on ﬁrms’ proﬁtability in the state sector (Meng, 2000).
It took the ﬁnancial collapse of many state-owned enterprises to initiate the real changes in
the urban labour market. In the mid 1990s, more than 40 per cent of the state-owned enterprises
were making losses. To vitalize the economy, the government ﬁnally made it legal for the state
enterprises to become bankrupt and to ﬁre unwanted workers. It was not until 1997 that a
policy to ‘keep the 1000 large scale state-owned enterprises and let go the small and medium
loss-making ﬁrms’ was implemented and in response there was a signiﬁcant shift in the labour
force from the state to the non-state sector. In 1997-98 around 12 million urban state sector
workers were laid oﬀ (Meng, 1998).
It was against this background that more and more workers shifted to private sector em-
ployment. Panel A of Figure 1 presents the total share of state sector employment for the urban
workers and for those who had ﬁve or less years of work experience. It shows that since 1997-98,
the proportion of workers employed in the state sector has been reducing rapidly, especially for
new entrants to the labour market. In 1997, around 75 per cent of new entrants were employed
in the state sector and by 2007 this ﬁgure had reduced to 40 per cent.
While most urban people were still working in the state/collective sectors, private sector
employment grew quickly. Since the early 1990s, China has embarked on an export-oriented
economic growth strategy. The growth of the FDI and joint venture ﬁrms increased demand for
unskilled workers in cities. This increase was met by the large scale inﬂow of rural migrants to
urban centres. According to the data available to us, in 1994 there were around 37 million rural
3migrant workers in cities, and by 2007 this had increased to 135 million (See Panel C of Figure
1). The most signiﬁcant inﬂow occurred around the end of the 1990s. The increase in migrant
labour supply was accompanied by a high proportion of the urban labour force exiting from the
labour market, and a shift of urban workers from unskilled production to service and clerical
occupations (panel B of Figure 1). Panel C of Figure 1 shows the increase in the working age
(16-60 years) of the urban non-student population who were not in the labour market, together
with the number of rural migrants working in cities for the period 1988 to 2007. The two trends
increase almost hand-in-hand.
Another important change in China, which might have a signiﬁcant impact on urban wage
inequality, is the expansion of higher education. Education levels of urban Chinese have been
aﬀected by signiﬁcant political changes. During the ten year Cultural Revolution (1966-1976),
schools were closed for many years. Universities did not begin normal student recruitment until
1977. As a result, an entire cohort of youth missed schooling for various numbers of years
(Meng and Gregory, 2002 and 2005a). After the Cultural Revolution, universities reopened
for the public and anybody who missed the opportunity to go to universities because of the
Cultural Revolution was allowed to sit the National College Entrance Examinations and those
who were successful were able to go to university regardless of their age.3 As a result, in
the 1980s and early 1990s the proportion of the labour force with a tertiary degree increased
signiﬁcantly. Throughout the 1990s the proportion of the work force with tertiary education
increased only slightly. Then, in 1999 the government decided to increase tertiary (three-year
college and above) enrolments by as much as 40 per cent (panel D of Figure 1). This university
enrollment expansion signiﬁcantly increased the supply of the skilled workers from the level
observed early this century. Panel E of Figure 1 depicts the change in the share of employed
males with diﬀerent levels of education. At the beginning of this period (1988-2007), more than
50 per cent of the male workers had education levels at or below junior high school and by the
end of the period this ratio had dropped to around 20 per cent. A reverse trend is found for
college or university degree holders. In 1988 a little more than 10 per cent of male workers had
a tertiary education and by the end of the period the ratio had increased to 40 per cent.
3College entrance in China normally has an age restriction.
4Finally, because of the introduction of the One-Child Policy at the end of the 1970s, the
urban population has aged signiﬁcantly (panel F of Figure 1). The proportion of young workers
with one to ten years of experience dropped from around 30 per cent of the total workforce at
the beginning of the period, to just below 20 per cent at the end. The proportion of those with
21 to 30 years of experience increased from 23 per cent to 34 per cent.
We now analyse how these changes have aﬀected the earnings distribution in the past 20
years.
3 Data and the general picture of earnings inequality
3.1 Data
The data used in this study come from the Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey
(UHIES) 1988-2007. The survey was conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics annually
since 1956, and was resumed in 1980 after its suspension during the Cultural Revolution–
1966-1976 (Fang et al. 2002). The electronic data are available from 1986. The survey samples
households with Urban Household Registration for every province in the nation. We use the
data from 16 of the 31 provinces including Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai,
Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan, Chongqing, Yunan,
and Gansu.
This is the only data set in China which goes back 20 years to record annual changes in
earnings during this extraordinary growth period. The survey was conducted for the purpose
of monitoring income and expenditure changes for households whose household registrations
(Hukou) are located in urban areas. It uses a diary record to collect individual earnings, other
forms of income, household income and expenditure related data. Basic individual demographic
and human capital variables are also available. The data have been widely used to analyse
income inequality, poverty, rates of return to education, and household savings in China (see,
for example, Han, Wailes, and Cramer, 1995; Fang et al., 2002; Gibson, Huang, and Rozelle,
2003; Meng, Gregory, and Wang, 2005b; Zhang, Zhao, Park, and Song, 2005; Meng, Gregory
5and Wan, 2007; and Chamon and Prasad, 2008).4
The UHIES questionnaire changed four times in 1988, 1992, 1996, and 2002. The important
change for this paper occurred in 1988. In 1986 to 1987, the only income information collected
at the individual level is the monthly standard wage. From 1988 onwards, the survey collected
individual work related earnings including standard wages, ﬂoating wages, bonuses, subsidies,
and other work related wages. Because the earnings measured in the 1986 and 1987 survey are
only a subset of earnings, these years are excluded from the analysis.
Another data related issue worth mentioning is the change in sampling procedure since 2002.
Before then the survey only sampled households with urban household registrations. Since 2002
the sampling covers all households with a residential address in an urban city where the survey
is conducted. However, the majority of rural-urban migrants either live on the periphery of
cities where rents are cheaper or in dormitories or workplaces such as construction sites. Only a
very limited number of households with rural household registration are included in the survey.
For example, in the 2003 survey there are around 2 per cent of individuals with rural household
registration in the sample. To keep consistency in the sampling population, individuals with
rural household registration in the 2002-2007 surveys are excluded. In addition to the change
in sampling coverage, sample size has also more than doubled since 2002.
As this study is on male earnings inequality, the sample includes male individuals aged 20
to 60 who are working and have a positive wage at the survey year.5 Excluding missing values,
for each of the 20 years the ﬁnal sample size ranges from 7400 to 26,900. Table 1 presents
the summary statistics of the data. It shows that over the 20 years, the mean age of the male
workers increased slightly from 39 to 42 years. Similarly, actual and potential work experience6
all increased slightly. Further, the average years of schooling increased from 11 years to almost
13 years, while the proportion of workers with tertiary and above education increased from 16
per cent at the beginning of the period to 41 per cent at the end. The most signiﬁcant change
4The survey design and sampling procedure have been discussed in great detail in the above mentioned papers.
5In urban China the majority of labour force work works full time. For example, using CHIPS 1995 and 2002
data where days and hours worked variables are available, we found that in 1995, 97% of the working population
in urban China worked 7 or more hours a day, while 99% worked 5 or more days a week. In 2002 the proportion
who worked 7 or more hours a day is 95%, and 97% worked 5 or more days a week.
6Potential work experience is calculated as: age minus years of schooling minus 7.
6is the increase in male annual real earnings7, which increased from 4,379 yuan in 1988 to 19,520
yuan in 2007, an increase of 346%.
3.2 General picture of earnings inequality
The above discussion focuses mainly on the mean values. As discussed in Section 2, the signif-
icant increase in mean earnings over the last 20 years was accompanied by changes in labour
market institutions and the structural change in labour demand and supply. The latter brought
about considerable shifts in the distribution of earnings.
Table 2 presents summary measures of earnings inequality during the 20 year period, includ-
ing the Gini coeﬃcient, the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentiles of real annual earnings, and
the variance of the logarithmic of real annual earnings. The table shows that overall earnings
inequality increased signiﬁcantly, by any measure. The Gini coeﬃcient increased from 0.23 to
0.37, an increase of 58 per cent. The ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentiles was 2.9 times in
1988 and increased to 5.4 times in 2007, an increase of 87 per cent. Similarly, the variance of
the log real annual earnings increased by 76 per cent over 20 years. Such an increase is much
higher than that found for the US where over the period of 26 years between 1963 to 1989, there
is a 72 per cent increase in variance of log weekly earnings (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1993).
Figure 2 shows the earnings inequality from diﬀerent aspects. All of them convey the same
story of a fast increase in earnings inequality. Below we pay particular attention to panels C,
Da n dE .
Panel C presents the change in real earnings for the 10th, 50th, and the 90th percentiles.
W eo b s e r v et h a ti nt h eﬁrst few years the earnings of the three groups went up almost equally.
Between the early to the end of the 1990s the 90th percentile went up much more than the
50th and the 10th percentile groups. Over this period, the bottom income group (the 10th
percentile) hardly changed from its early 1990s level. This pattern coincides well with the fact
that during this period drastic state enterprise reform led to a signiﬁcant drop in earnings for
the loss making ﬁrms. After the year 2000, the earnings of low income workers started to grow
7Real earnings are calculated using nominal earnings deﬂated by provincial level CPI which is set at 100 for
1995.
7again, but the rate of change was slower than that of the 90th percentile group.
Panel D of Figure 2 shows the ratio of the ﬁnal years (2005—2007) and the base years
earnings (1988—90) for each percentile to indicate the percentage changes over 20 years for the
entire distribution. To reduce the measurement error problem, we take the ratio of the average
of the last three years (2005—2007) and that of the ﬁrst three years (1988—1990). The scatter
plot indicates the actual changes while the solid line shows the linear prediction. The graph
reveals that over the 20 year period the real earnings at the bottom more than doubled, while
at the top they increased by ﬁve or more times.
The ﬁnal panel (Panel E of Figure 2) illustrates the same ratios for diﬀerent periods. There,
we see diﬀerent patterns over time. The period from the late 1980s to the early 1990s had very
small changes in earnings inequality, while the decade beginning in 1990 has the largest increase
in inequality. In this period there is a real earnings drop for the very low earnings group, but
a more than 60 per cent increase for the very high earnings group. The years between the
late 1990s and early 2000s also witnessed large increases in inequality but that was mainly
driven by the larger increase in earnings at the top of the distribution. Earnings increased most
dramatically relative to other periods between the early to mid 2000s, but the increase is almost
equally distributed and earnings inequality did not change signiﬁcantly.
The above descriptive analysis focuses mainly on the overall inequality. As signiﬁcant insti-
tutional and structural changes have occurred in the Chinese urban labour market, the changes
in earnings inequality may have aﬀected diﬀerent groups diﬀerentially, as indicated in Section 2.
Figure 3 presents the variance of the log real earnings by level of work experience, education, oc-
cupation, and sector of employment. The graphs indicate earnings inequality for within-groups.
Panel A shows that earnings inequality is more serious among younger workers than it is among
the older ones. However, since the late 1990s, there has not been a further widening of earnings
inequality among younger workers, whereas for the older workers the inequality continued to
increase until 2004. This pattern of wider inequality among the less experienced is unusual from
the point of view of western labour markets, where within-group inequality is usually higher
among the experienced (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1993 and Lemieux, 2006). This diﬀerence,
perhaps, is the result of the signiﬁcant labour market transition from a planned to a market-
8oriented economy. It is the young workers who are more likely to enter into the market-oriented
private sector, where earnings dispersion has been much wider than in the public sector (see
Panel C of Figure 3). Indeed, even at the beginning of the period (1988), 27 per cent of the
group with 1—10 years of experience were not working in the state sector, while for the older
group the ratio was 10 per cent. Over time this gap increased. By the end of the period 52 per
cent of the young group were not working in the state sector, whereas for those with more than
20 years of experience the proportion is 35 per cent. Another reason for the young to have a
larger within-group earnings variance may be related to the steepness of the age-earnings proﬁle
during the ﬁrst ten years of their career.
Panel B of Figure 3 depicts the variance of log real earnings for individuals with tertiary
education (three-year college and above, labeled ‘educated’ hereafter) and those with junior high
school and below education (labeled ‘less-educated’ hereafter). Unlike many western countries,
earnings inequality is much higher among the less-educated group. This, perhaps, is related
to the fact that during the Cultural Revolution (1966—1976) entire cohorts of youth were not
able to go to school and hence were forced into the less educated group even though their
innate ability might otherwise allow them to enter the educated group had they been given the
opportunity to do so. Thus, within the less-educated group the ability distribution should be
wider than that of the educated group. Between the 1980s and the 1990s, as China moved from
a planned to a market-oriented economy, ability was gradually being rewarded and hence we
observe the sharp increase in within-group earnings inequality during this period for both the
educated and less-educated. However, as the Cultural Revolution cohorts gradually retire and
more educated young people enter the labour market, especially after the university expansion
in the late 1990s, the inequality of earnings within the less educated group begins to drop,
while within the educated group inequality continues to increase. This changing pattern of
the ability composition within the educated and less-educated groups will remain an important
issue throughout the paper.
Panel C of Figure 3 investigates the earnings dispersion within the state (state and collective
sectors) and non-state sectors. As expected, the earnings dispersion within the non-state sector
is much larger than in the state sector. From the mid-1990s onwards, however, the inequality
9within the non-state sector dropped signiﬁcantly for reasons unclear to us at this point. Note
that the sample size for the non-state sector is very small for the data between 1988 and 1993
and relatively small for the period 1994 to 1996. Thus, it is possible that the extremely high
variance during the period of 1991—1996 is due to sample noise and should not be taken seriously.
Within the state sector the earnings inequality started oﬀ from a fairly low level and increased
continuously during the 1990s. Since the early 2000s the within state sector earnings variance
has kept constant.
The last panel (Panel D) examines diﬀerent patten of inequality for diﬀerent occupation
groups. Service/clerical workers and production workers exhibit larger within-group earnings
inequality than the highly educated professional and managerial groups. The decline of earnings
inequality among production workers from 1999 onwards may be related to two factors: First,
the large scale inﬂow of the rural migrant workers crowded out many urban local workers who
exited from the labour market. We might assume that the crowding out eﬀect mainly aﬀected
the bottom of the ability distribution and hence narrowed down the earnings inequality among
urban local production workers. Second, the large scale university expansion from the late 1990s
has allowed lower ability workers to move up to better skilled jobs, which in turn reduced the
earnings distribution at the bottom. The latter eﬀect may be conﬁrmed by the same pattern
of decline in inequality for the production workers and for the less-educated group (see Panel
B for junior high school and below group).
The general inequality picture presented here indicates that there has been a considerable
increase in earnings inequality, occurring mainly in the 1990s. The changes in inequality among
diﬀerent groups of the labour force, however, is not the same.
4M e t h o d o l o g y
The increase in earnings inequality is often decomposed into the change in the price of observable
characteristics, the change in the distribution of observable characteristics, and the change in the
residual, which is normally labelled as ‘the price of unobserved skills’ under certain assumption
(See, for example, Juhn, Merphy, and Pierce, 1993; DiNardo, Fortin). We follow Lemieux (2002
10and 2006) to decompose the change in variance of log earnings over time. Consider the following
earnings equation:
yit = xitβt +  it, (1)
where yit is the log of the annual earnings of individual i at year t; xit is a vector of observable
characteristics (we include education and labour market experience for the Baseline Model and
education, experience, and state sector employment for the Extended Model); βt is a vector of
return to observable characteristics; and  it is the error term. Lemieux (2002) shows that the
variance of the log earnings can be written as:
Vit = Va r(yit)=
X
i












where ω is the sample weight, b β is the vector of OLS estimates of β,a n du is the residual from
the OLS regression of equation (1). In the second part of the equation (2), the subscript j
indicates the number of skill cells in the sample (for example, if x is a vector of experience and
education categories, j will be the number of experience-education cells in the sample); σ2
jt is
the within-cell residual variance, and θj is the proportion of observations in cell j of the sample
(in the case where x are all dummy variables, θ will be x).
To decompose the change in the variance of earnings between year t and year s,L e m i e u x
(2002) proposes two counterfactual variances. The ﬁrst is to replace b βt in Equation (2) with b βs
which is obtained by estimating Equation (1) with period s data. Thus, the ﬁrst counterfactual


















The second counterfactual variance, denoted as V b, is to replace θjt in Equation (3) by θjs,


















Using the two counterfactual variances, V a and V b, we can decompose the change in variance
of earnings between periods t and s into three components: 1. a portion which is due to the
change in the return to the observables (∆b β); 2. a portion which is due to the change in the
composition of the sample (∆θj); and 3. a portion which is due to the change in the within-cell
residual variance (∆σj). Thus, Vt − Vs m a yb ew r i t t e na s :





















where pt is price for unobservables. He then assumes that the distribution of unobservable skills
among workers within each skill cell j is stable over time, thus, σ2
jt = σ2
js = σ2
j. Because of this,





where Vjt varies only if the price for unobservables varies over time.
The assumption that the distribution of the unobservable skills within skill cell is constant
over time is unrealistic for China. One example may be worth mentioning. As discussed in
Section 2, the signiﬁcant expansion in college enrolment in 1999 enabled a large number of less
capable people to obtain degrees. Thus, within the college cell the unobserved skill distribution
should widen signiﬁcantly and, at the same time, the distribution of the unobservable skill
distribution for the less educated group shouldn a r r o w . H e n c e , t h el a s tt e r mi nE q u a t i o n
(5) not only represents the change in price for the unobservables, but also the change in their
distribution.
125 Decomposition of earnings inequality
5.1 Results from the earnings equations
We ﬁrst estimate the earnings equation (Equation (1)) for each of the 20 years between 1988 and
2007. To reduce measurement error problems, we exclude the top and bottom 1 per cent of the
sample. Two speciﬁcations of the earnings equation are used. The baseline model controls for
four categories of education (three-year college and above, technical school, senior high school,
and junior high school and below), four categories of years of work experience (1-10 years, 11-20
years, 21-30 years, and 31 and above years) and provincial ﬁxed eﬀects. This speciﬁcation is
consistent with that used in most U.S. studies on wage inequality. The inclusion of provincial
dummy variables is necessary to control for signiﬁcant spatial price variations (Brandt and
Holz, 2006 and Gong and Meng, 2008).8 In addition, we also extend the baseline model with
an additional dummy variable indicating whether an individual is working in the state sector or
not because the switch between the state and non-state sector is probably an important factor
in the change in earnings inequality.
Tables 3 and 4 present the results for the Baseline and the Extended Models, respectively. In
both cases the omitted category is 1-10 years experience and junior high school and below. The
results in Table 3 show that there seems to be a very signiﬁcant return to years of experience.
The longer the experience, the higher the return throughout the 20 year period. However,
relative to the group with 1-10 years of experience, the change in the return to experience
varies signiﬁcantly for diﬀerent experience groups over diﬀerent periods. In the late 1980s and
early 1990s those with 11-20 years of experience earned around 35 per cent more than those
with 1-10 years of experience. Since the early 1990s the return to experience for this group
has reduced to around 25-28 per cent. For those with more work experience (21-30 years and
above 30 years of experience), the reduction in relative returns has been more dramatic and
continuous. For individuals with 21-30 years of experience the returns reduced from 48 per cent
in 1988 to 34 per cent in 2007, while for those with more than 30 years of experience the return
8We assume that provincial variations are fully captured by the changes in βsa n dXs and will have no eﬀect
either on residual variance distribution across groups or within groups.
13drops from 55 per cent to 35 per cent. The most signiﬁcant reduction occurred in the period
between the early 1990s and the early 2000s when the economy experienced the most signiﬁcant
deregulation. During the planned economic era, wages were administratively determined and
seniority was one of the most important considerations in the earnings determination process.
The market oriented economic reform has gradually abolished the seniority determined wage
system and hence, at the end of the reform period the return to work experience has started to
reﬂect labour productivity (Meng and Kidd, 1997 and Meng, 2000).
While the return to experience has been reducing, the return to education has been increas-
ing. Compared to the less-educated group (junior high school and below), the senior high,
technical school, and three-year college and above groups in 1988 earned 2, 7, and 13 per cent
more. By 2007, the same ratios increased to 17, 27, and 56 per cent, respectively.
Panels A and B of Figure 4 present these changes visually. The most important message
evident in Panel A is the continuous decline in the rate of returns to experience, especially for
the groups with 21 and above years of work experience. Panel B shows that the most signiﬁcant
increase in returns to tertiary education (college and above) occurred during the 1990s. By
the early 2000s this trend had ﬂattened out. This, perhaps, is related closely to the college
expansion policy. The patterns for technical and senior high schools are similar, but to a lesser
extent.
The Extended Model (Table 4) presents a similar picture of the change in rates of return to
education and work experience. The additional variable, employment in state- or collectively-
owned enterprises, has had dramatic changes in its payoﬀs. During the late 1980s and early
1990s, employees in the state or collective sectors were paid higher earnings than their counter-
pars in other sectors. These payoﬀs had disappeared in the 1990s, and then in the mid-1990s the
return became negative as a large proportion of the state- or collective-owned ﬁrms were making
losses. It was not until the early 2000s that the payoﬀ to state and collective employment was
again positive (see Panel C of Figure 4).
Another way to gauge the contribution of each set of variables included in the regressions
when explaining the total earnings variation is to derive a bounded range of the contributions
using partial and marginal R2s for each set (see Dickens and Katz, 1987). We plot the upper
14bound (the partial R2s) of the contributions.9 These are presented in Panel D of Figure 4. Some
striking features are worth noting. First, in the late 1980s, experience alone explained around
25 per cent of the earnings variances and the eﬀect reduced dramatically over time. By 2007 it
only explained less than 3 per cent of the earnings variation, suggesting the disappearing of a
seniority-driven wage determination system. Second, in the 1990s, provincial dummy variables
explained around 20 per cent of the earnings variations and it was not until the late 1990s that
this eﬀect decreased and stayed at around 10 per cent of the earnings variation for the rest of
the period. Finally, education did not become an important factor until after the mid-1990s.
Another issue worth mentioning is the extent to which earnings variations can be explained
by all the observed characteristics. The estimated earnings regression results show a decline
of the adjusted R2s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the adjusted R2s are around 0.33 to
0.38. From the mid-1990s the adjusted R2s start to decline, and by the end of the period, the
observable characteristics can only explain 23 to 25 percent of the earnings variations. Thus,
over time, the residual component of the earnings variations has increased signiﬁcantly.
5.2 Decomposing the total earnings inequality
We apply Lemieux’s (2002) decomposition method in order to understand what generated the
large increase in earnings inequality over the last 20 years. Table 5 presents the change in
variance of earnings between 1988 and 2007, as well as for four diﬀerent time periods within
this 20-year period, (i.e. 1988-1992, 1992-1998, 1998-2003, and 2003-2007). The top panel of
the table uses the Baseline Model with 1988 as the base year. The ﬁrst column presents the
change in variance between 1988 and 2007. During the 20 year period, the total variance of log
earnings increased by 0.21, which is a 76 per cent increase to its 1988 level of 0.27. Of the total
change in variance, 91 per cent is due to the increase in the sum of the within-group residual
variances. The composition eﬀect (that is the change in the proportions of people in diﬀerent
education-experience cells) contributes to a narrowing of the earnings inequality by 13 per cent.
The change in returns to observable characteristics contributes to the increase in the earnings
9We also calculated the lower bound of the impact of each set of variables on earnings variation by adding
each set of the variables to the existing sets of variables to see their marginal contribution to the R
2s. These
results are similar to those presented in Panel D of Figure 4 and are available upon request from the authors.
15variation. These two eﬀects, however, almost cancel each other out.
The next four columns split the period into four sub-periods. In the 1988-1992 period
the urban economy operated under the old planned economy system and earnings inequality
reduced slightly. Of the small change observed, the composition eﬀect and the changes in
the within-group residual variances contribute almost equally to the narrowing in the earnings
inequality.
Urban economic reform in China took place mainly in the 1990s. During this period, many
state-owned factories were making losses and more-able workers switched to the private sector
while less-able workers exited from the labour market. It was during this period that the earnings
inequality widened the most. Over the seven years between 1992 and 1998, the variance of the
log earnings increased from 0.16 to 0.32, which accounted for more than three quarters of the
total increase in the variance of log earnings over the entire 20 years. Of the total change of 0.16
variance, 88 per cent can be attributed to the increase in the within-group residual variances.
The 1998-2003 period continue to see the increase in variance of the log earnings (by 0.08),
which is the second largest change among the four sub-periods. Once again the increase in the
within-group residual variances explains the most of the change in the earnings inequality.
During the 2003—2007 period the earnings inequality declined and it was mainly the change in
the within-group residual variances which contributed to this decline. The negative contribution
of the within-group residual variances may, to a large extent, be related to the signiﬁcant inﬂow
of tertiary graduates to the labour market from 2002 onwards. This increase in the supply of
skilled labour should have played an important role in the slowing down of earnings inequality.
We will come back to this point later in this section.
The above results suggest that during the 1990s when earnings inequality increased most
signiﬁcantly the major contributing factor to inequality is the increase in within-group residual
inequality, whereas both the late 1980s to the early 1990s period and the 2000s period experi-
enced a reduction in the earnings inequality. Panel A of Figure 5 presents the decomposition
results for each of the 20 years, where 1988 is used as the base year. Thus, the changes in the
return to observable characteristics are predicted using every year’s regression coeﬃcients, but
1988 Xs. Similarly, the changes in composition eﬀects and the changes in within-group residual
16variances are both calculated relative to 1988. The trend presented in this ﬁgure conﬁrms the
dominant role which the changes in the within-group variance played in explaining the increase
in earnings inequality during the 1990s and the slowing down of the increase during the 2000s.
The second panel of Table 5 presents the same decomposition results, but this time using
2007 as the base year. As all decompositions suﬀer from the index number problem, this panel
is presented so to allow us to gauge the bounds of the eﬀects. The trends indicated here (and
in Panel B of Figure 5) are largely consistent with those obtained using 1988 as the base year.
The last panel of Table 5 shows the results from the Extended Model, which includes an
additional dummy variable indicating whether an individual is employed in the state/collective
sector or the non-state sector. The decomposition uses 2007 as the base year.10 Relative to the
results presented in the second panel of this table, we ﬁnd that including the state/collective
employment dummy variable increases the composition eﬀect and reduces the within-group
residual variance eﬀect signiﬁcantly. When not controlling for state/collective employment, the
composition eﬀect contributes a mere 4 per cent reduction in the change in earnings variations.
Once the state/collective employment is controlled for, the composition eﬀect becomes positive
23 per cent, suggesting that the shift from state to non-state employment contributes to 27 per
cent (4 per cent plus 23 per cent) of the total increase in the earnings variations. Similarly, the
eﬀect of within-group residual variances reduced from contributing to 88 per cent of the total
change to 65 per cent of the total change. This is quite a signiﬁcant eﬀect, indicating that the
diﬀerence in earnings inequality between the state and non-state sectors is an important part of
the story of the increase in earnings inequality during this period. We also ﬁnd that the major
changes occurred between 1998 and 2003, and this coincides with the signiﬁcant reduction in
the state/collective employment as presented in Panel A of Figure 1 in Section 2.
Even though including state/collective employment increases the contribution of the com-
position eﬀect, the general dominance of the within-group residual variance over the period
does not change. For the entire period, it still accounted for 65 per cent of the changes in the
variance of the earnings, and for the period 1993—1998 it accounted for 87 per cent of the total
10In 1988, 98 per cent of the sample were employed in either the state or collective sectors. Thus, if we use
1988 as the base year, many education/experience/sector-of-employment cells will be empty, and this makes the
decomposition impossible.
17change. This can also be seen from Panel C of Figure 5.
6 What caused the changing pattern of the within-group resid-
ual variances?
The above analysis indicates that the most signiﬁcant increase in earnings inequality for urban
male workers occurred in the 1990s and the main contributing factor is the increase in the sum of
the within-group residual variances. From the early 2000s the increase in earnings inequality has
stopped and so has the increase in within-group residual variances. The question naturally arises
as to what are the driving forces behind the changing pattern of the residual variances over the
past 20 years? To answer this question we ﬁrst examine whether the change in the dispersion of
within-group residual variances has the same trend for diﬀerent skill groups. Figure 6 presents
the changes in residual log earnings variances by education and experience cells. While Panels
A and B of Figure 6 show the diﬀerent trends in the residual variance for diﬀerent experience
groups within the educated (college and above) and less educated (Junior high and below)
groups, respectively, Panels C and D present the changes for diﬀerent education levels within
the 1—10 (labeled as ‘young’) and 21—30 (labeled as ‘old’) years of experience groups.
The ﬁgure shows that the signiﬁcant increase in the within-group residual variances between
the early 1990s and the early 2000s is common for both young and old, and educated and
less-educated groups. However, since the early 2000s the growth of the within-group residual
variances has plateaued, but the speed of change varied across diﬀerent skill groups. While in
the educated group there is a similar slowing down of the increase in the within-group variances
for the young and the old groups, the rate of the slowing down in the less-educated group for
the young seems to be much faster than that for the old. The latter generated a signiﬁcant
narrowing of the gap in the within-group residual variances between the old and young in the
less-educated group (Panel B) and for the young across diﬀerent education categories (Panel
C).
186.1 Causes of the increase in the within-group residual variances in the 1990s
What could be the reason for the considerable increase in the residual variance from the early
1990s to the early 2000s? In the literature changes in within-group residual variances are often
fully attributed to changes in price for unobserved skills while the within-group distribution of
unobserved skills is assumed to be held constant over time (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993 and
Lemieux, 2002 and 2006).11 This is quite a reasonable assumption if over time the proportion
of the labour force across diﬀerent skill cells does not change very much. As indicated in the
Background Section, over the past 20 years the skill levels of the urban male labour force has
changed signiﬁcantly, but in the 1990s (especially between 1994-99) the changes have been
moderate (see Panels E of Figure 1). This leads us to believe that it is unlikely that the
distribution of the unobserved skill within each group has changed much for this period, and
hence the increase in the within group residual variances is more likely to be driven by the
increase in the price for unobserved skills. After all, it is reasonable to assume that the observed
and unobserved skills are highly correlated, and hence, the increase in returns to education in
the 1990s could also be a sign of the increase in returns to unobserved skills. The question,
however, is what might have generated the increase in the returns to unobserved skills.
There could be two possible causes. One is the increase in demand for unobserved skills, of
which ‘skill biased technical change’ is often cited as the driving force (Acemoglu, 2002). The
other possible cause is the changes in the wage determination system due to the shift from a
planned to a market economy. In the planned economic system, wages were administratively
determined and wage distribution across diﬀerent skill groups was very compressed (see, for
example, Meng, 2000; Benjamin, Brandt, Giles, and Wang, 2009). The process of marketization
has increased the returns to education and other productivity related observed and unobserved
skills.
A recent study on the causes of the increase in the returns to education for urban local
workers in the 1990s has attributed most of the increase in returns to education to skill-biased
technical change (Liu, Park, and Zhao, 2010). However, the empirical method used in their
11Lemieux (2002 and 2006) also discussed the measurement error as a potential reason. As it is less likely to
be an important contributing factor for China, we do not discuss this issue here.
19study may not be able to disentangle the two possible causes discussed above. Following Katz
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where (Wh
Wl ) is relative earnings of skilled and unskilled workers, and Nh
Nl is the relative employ-
ment of the skilled and unskilled workers. The basic idea of this method is that the relative
supply of skilled labour increases and moves the employment ratio down the downward slop-
ping demand curve over time and this eﬀect will be captured by β. If there is any (skill-biased)
technical change occurring over time, it shifts the demand curve (upward) and this eﬀect will
be captured by the coeﬃcient on the time trend (α). Given that the elasticity of substitution is
greater than 1, a positive α will imply a skill-biased technical change. However, in the Chinese
case a positive α is also consistent with the fact that the institutional change towards a market
economy has increased wages of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers. Thus, simply
obtaining a positive α cannot identify whether the signiﬁcant increase in within group residual
variances is caused by the increase in demand for skilled workers or by institutional change.12
In fact, we are more inclined to believe that the latter may have played a more important
role. As discussed earlier, China experienced its most signiﬁcant labour market reform in the
1990s. During this period we observe a considerable drop in the returns to experience (seniority)
and increase in the returns to education (Figure 4), reﬂecting the switching regime of wage
determination. Furthermore, if skill-biased technical change is the main driving force, we might
observe a continuation or even a speeding-up of the increase in within-group residual variances
in the 2000s as this is an even faster economic growth period. Instead, the 2000s has seen a
slowing down of the increase in within-group residual variances.
12Another potential issue related to using Katz and Murphy (1992) style method to examine the eﬀect of
skill-biased technical change is related to lack of suitable data. As discussed in Liu, Park, and Zhao (2010) apart
from the census 1990 and 2000 and inter-census 1995 and 2005, almost all the other data recording the urban
labour market in China exclude rural-urban migrants, which accounted for around 30% of the urban labour force
in 2005.
206.2 Why did the increase in within-group residual variances plateau at a
diﬀerent rate for diﬀerent skill groups in the 2000s?
Given our conjecture that the signiﬁcant increase in within-group residual variances in the
1990s is mainly caused by institutional changes in wage setting and given that this process
was virtually completed by the early 2000s, we would expect that the increase in within-group
residual variances should stop from the early 2000s. This, indeed, is the case (see Figure 6).
However, what is surprising is that the slowing down of the increase in within-group residual
variances occurs at a diﬀerent rate for diﬀerent skill groups. Within the college group the gap in
residual variances between the young and old remained constant over the entire period, but for
the less-educated group there was a narrowing of the gap in the residual variances between the
young and the old. There was also a narrowing of the gap between educated and less-educated
groups for those with 1 to 10 years of experience. In other words, the rate of slowing down is
much faster for the young than for the old and within the young it is much faster for the less-
educated than for the educated. This pattern is more obvious if we reproduce the two graphs
from Panels C and D of Figure 6, excluding the technical and senior high school groups (see
Figure 8). For the young group (1-10 years of experience), the gap between residual variances
for the educated and the less-educated groups narrowed signiﬁcantly in the 2000s. This pattern,
however, is not observed for the old group (21—30 years of experience) where, in the 2000s, the
variance between the more and less educated groups has widened. Why is this the case?
We believe that this diﬀerence, to a large extent, is related to the change in the within-
group distribution of unobserved skills. Even though the literature often assumes that the
within-group distribution of unobserved skills is held constant over time (Juhn, Murphy and
Pierce, 1993 and Lemieux, 2002 and 2006), this assumption may not be valid in our setting.13
O n ep o s s i b l ec a u s ef o ro v e r - t i m ec h a n g e si nt he distribution of within-group unobserved
ability is the signiﬁcant changes in education attainment. As discussed in the background
section, the signiﬁcant education expansion occurred in 1999 when there was a sudden increase
in college and university enrolment of more than 40 per cent. Since then the speed of the
13In fact Lemieux (2002) has discussed in great detail how the change in within-group distribution of unobserved
skill may aﬀect the changes in within-group residual variances.
21expansion has not slowed (see Panel D of Figure 1). Panel E of Figure 1 shows that in 1988,
16 per cent of the total male labour force had a tertiary qualiﬁcation and by 2007 this ratio
had increased to above 40 per cent. While the proportion of technical and senior high school
graduates did not change much over the same period, the ratio of the work force with junior
high school or below education reduced from over 48 per cent in 1988 to less than 24 per cent
in 2007.
How should the increase in college enrolment aﬀect the within-group distribution of unob-
served skills? The following example may illustrate this clearly. Assume that the unobserved
skill distributions for the two periods for the population are constant, and that the total popula-
tion is divided into two groups: the educated and the less-educated. Assume that in period one,
only 10 per cent of the population is in the educated group, and in period two this increases to
40 per cent. In this situation, the within-group distribution of unobserved skills for the educated
group should be wider in the second period than in the ﬁrst period, while for the less-educated
group it should be narrower in the second period than that in the ﬁrst period. This is because
only relatively able people can pass the college entry exam and receive an education at a col-
lege or higher level. When there is a signiﬁcant expansion of tertiary enrolment, the less-able
people will be admitted to tertiary education, and hence widen the ability distribution within
the educated group and narrow the ability distribution within the less-educated group.
This distributional change of unobserved skills for the educated and less-educated groups
is illustrated in Figure 8, where the normal distribution curve represents the distribution of
unobserved skills for the entire population for both period 1 (t)a n dp e r i o d2( t +1 ). The
two grey bars indicate the division between the educated and less-educated groups in period
1( h i g h t) and period 2 (hight+1). As society decides to educate more people it lowers the
‘standard’ required to be in the educated group (the grey bar moves to the left). As a result, the
distribution of unobserved skills within the educated group widens from the distance ‘educated
t’ to the distance ‘educated t +1 ’, while that of the less-educated group narrows by the same
amount (from ‘less-educated t’ to ‘less-educated t +1 ’).
Of course, the variance of unobserved ability within the educated and less-educated groups
not only depends on the “distance” but also on the shape of the distribution. To ensure that the
22above claims are valid for our data, we carry out the following simulations. First we generate
four diﬀerent random samples of 5,000 observations each with a normal distribution. The ﬁrst
sample has mean zero and standard deviation equal to one. For the next three samples, the
means and standard deviations are set the same as our 1988, 1997, and 2006 samples. We
then rank these observations within each sample and calculate the variance for each of the
four full samples and then for the samples excluding an additional 100 observations at a time
from the top of the distribution to the bottom (i.e. the ﬁrst sample has 5,000 observation, the
second excludes the top 100 observations, the third exclude additional 100 observations, until
the ﬁftieth sample, which has 100 observation of the lowest value). This gives us 50 variances
for each experiment for each sample. If the “distance” is positively related with the variances
given the mean and the standard deviation of the distribution, we should observe that each new
variance calculated with 100 less observations should be smaller than the previous one. Our
results for all four samples (each with 1,000 experiments) are presented in Appendix A, which
shows that in all cases our original conclusion that the “distance” is positively correlated with
the variance is true given the shape of our chosen distributions.14
Our simple example shows that when the proportion of the labour force with tertiary ed-
ucation doubles while proportion of labour force with junior high school education reduces by
half, it is not possible to assume that the within-group distribution of unobserved ability is held
constant over time and all the changes in the within-group residual variances are due to the
change in price for the unobserved ability. Based on the timing of the nationwide education
expansion, we would expect that in the 2000s, the change in the within-group distribution of
unobserved skills would play an increasing role in explaining the change in the within-group
residual variance. In addition, we would expect that the distributional change would aﬀect the
young more than the old and that it should increase the within group residual variance for the
educated and reduce it for the less-educated.
Indeed, our empirical results are rather consistent with these predictions. To show this more
clearly we take diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences of Panels A and B of Figure 7 (the diﬀerence between
the educated and less-educated in the young group minus the diﬀerence between the educated
14More details of the simulations are available upon request from the authors.
23and less-educated in the old group). If the diﬀerence between the educated and less-educated in
the young group mimics that in the old group we should see the diﬀ-in-diﬀ plot hovering around
the zero line. Figure 9 presents this diﬀ-in-diﬀs plot and it shows that for the late 1980s and
most of the 1990s the diﬀ-in-diﬀs values do not deviate from zero much, but since the 2000s,
the diﬀerence of within-group residual variances between the educated and less-educated for the
young group is widened signiﬁcantly relative to that for the old group.
Although the pattern of changes in within-group variances among diﬀerent groups presented
in Figure 7 ﬁts in with our predictions, there are some details which do not ﬁte x a c t l y . I n
particular, although the left panel of Figure 7 indicates a reduction in within-group residual
variance for the less-educated in the young group in the 2000s, it does not show a similar degree
of increase in the within-group variance for the educated group, as we predicted. Our conjecture
for this inconsistency is that, perhaps, the signiﬁcant increase in the supply of educated labour
force has not only suppressed the price for observable skills but also that for unobservable skills.
Thus, the increased ‘distance’ in distribution increases the residual variance for this group but
the supressed price for unobservables oﬀset the distribution eﬀect. This may be conﬁrmed by
t h ef a c tt h a tw i t h o u ts i g n i ﬁcant changes in the distribution of the unobservable skills for the
educated in the old group, the within-group residual variance for this group has also declined.
Thus, the decrease in the price for unobservable skills oﬀsets the eﬀect of the increase in the
distribution of the unobservable skills for the young educated group. Had there not been a
slowing down of the rewards to the observable and unobservable skills, we would have observed
an increase in within-group residual variances for the educated young group.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we examine the change in male earnings inequality in urban China during a period
of unprecedented economic growth and signiﬁcant institutional changes. We ﬁnd that over the
twenty year period, earnings inequality increased by almost 60 per cent when inequality is
measured by the Gini coeﬃcient and 76 per cent when it is measured by the variance of log real
earnings. Such a signiﬁcant increase has not been seen in many other countries.
24Our analysis indicates that while the changes in prices for observable skills and the changes
in composition of the male labour force explained some of the changes, more than 80 per cent
of the increases in earnings inequality during this period was due to the increase in the within-
group residual inequality.
Our analysis suggests that during the 1990s the increases in within-group residual variances
are mainly due to the increases in returns to unobservable skills. As the economy transformed
from a system where wages were administratively determined to a market system, the reward
to both observed and unobserved skills increased.
In the 2000s, however, we note that the trend in within-group residual variances changes
signiﬁcantly. This is a result of a combination of the changes in the distribution of the within-
group unobserved skills and a reduction in the reward to the unobservable (as well as observable)
skills due to the over supply of the labour force with tertiary qualiﬁcation. As a result of the
signiﬁcant expansion of college enrolments from the late 1990s, the within-group unobserved
skill distribution widened in the educated group and narrowed in the less-educated group. We
found that this change in the distribution of within-group unobserved skills could, perhaps,
explain a large part of the slowing down of the changes in within-group residual variances.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, 1988‐2007
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age (year) 39.03 10.41 39.23 10.31 39.44 10.34 38.96 9.99 39.13 10.03 39.35 9.97 39.16 9.85 39.51 9.69 39.73 9.59 39.82 9.37
Years of schooling (year) 10.95 2.89 11.11 2.92 11.23 2.87 11.39 2.92 11.52 2.73 11.58 2.67 11.72 2.68 11.77 2.65 11.78 2.62 11.77 2.63
% with 3 year college & above  0.16 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
Actual work experience (year) 19.40 10.44 19.96 10.35 20.29 10.38 19.85 10.09 19.95 10.15 20.20 10.04 20.11 10.00 20.46 9.82 20.68 9.78 20.71 9.65
Potential work experience (year) 21.03 10.92 21.07 10.90 21.19 10.88 20.56 10.63 20.59 10.57 20.76 10.47 20.44 10.40 20.74 10.22 20.94 10.19 21.05 10.04
log real annual earnings 8.27 0.52 8.25 0.50 8.32 0.48 8.37 0.47 8.51 0.48 8.56 0.54 8.63 0.61 8.67 0.60 8.69 0.61 8.72 0.64
Real annual earnings (yuan) 4379 1978 4271 1985 4537 2117 4765 2369 5520 3108 5991 3647 6632 4349 6849 4334 7052 4821 7390 5150
No. of observations 7,890 7,087 7,470 7,587 9,845 9,477 9,443
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age (year) 40.09 9.26 40.42 9.12 40.31 9.30 40.98 9.13 41.55 9.00 41.81 8.93 42.19 8.93 42.01 9.08 42.38 9.01 42.36 9.16
Years of schooling (year) 11.88 2.60 12.00 2.58 12.04 2.67 12.01 2.63 12.35 2.67 12.42 2.65 12.48 2.67 12.53 2.71 12.64 2.69 12.75 2.68
% with 3 year college & above  0.28 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.36 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.38 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.42 0.49
Actual work experience (year) 20.96 9.60 21.32 9.53 20.82 9.89 21.42 9.83 21.06 9.71 21.31 9.72 21.60 9.79 21.24 9.97 21.56 9.94 21.96 10.18
Potential work experience (year) 21.20 9.95 21.43 9.83 21.27 10.09 21.97 9.94 22.19 9.93 22.39 9.85 22.70 9.86 22.47 10.01 22.73 9.94 22.60 10.13
log real annual earnings 8.76 0.66 8.84 0.66 8.90 0.70 8.98 0.69 9.14 0.66 9.20 0.69 9.31 0.68 9.40 0.69 9.49 0.69 9.64 0.69
Real annual earnings (yuan) 7725 5611 8318 5329 9161 6768 9875 7137 11320 7932 12298 9203 13740 10769 15196 12098 16723 13473 19520 18132










1988 0.232 2.879 0.275
1989 0.238 2.932 0.247
1990 0.231 2.899 0.230
1991 0.234 2.739 0.222
1992 0.242 2.775 0.233
1993 0.275 3.246 0.297
1994 0.309 3.917 0.367
1995 0.300 3.745 0.356
1996 0.311 3.853 0.374
1997 0.320 4.011 0.413
1998 0.327 4.216 0.430
1999 0.316 4.292 0.436
2000 0.341 4.881 0.490
2001 0.340 4.769 0.472
2002 0.323 4.539 0.420
2003 0.354 5.362 0.541
2004 0.362 5.238 0.506
2005 0.369 5.530 0.524
2006 0.367 5.493 0.502
2007 0.368 5.384 0.483
Source: Authors' own calculation using the UHIES data 1988‐2007.
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Table 3: Selected regression results from the baseline model, 1988‐2007
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Experience 11‐20 years 0.364*** 0.346*** 0.361*** 0.286*** 0.267*** 0.287*** 0.270*** 0.278*** 0.279*** 0.264***
[0.0108] [0.0119] [0.0109] [0.0107] [0.00949] [0.0114] [0.0128] [0.0131] [0.0136] [0.0146]
Experience 21‐30 years 0.484*** 0.467*** 0.493*** 0.422*** 0.402*** 0.436*** 0.439*** 0.415*** 0.404*** 0.390***
[0.0117] [0.0124] [0.0110] [0.0108] [0.00947] [0.0112] [0.0130] [0.0132] [0.0135] [0.0143]
Experience >30 years 0.548*** 0.539*** 0.577*** 0.494*** 0.475*** 0.496*** 0.507*** 0.484*** 0.490*** 0.452***
[0.0130] [0.0135] [0.0121] [0.0124] [0.0110] [0.0131] [0.0152] [0.0153] [0.0157] [0.0170]
College 0.127*** 0.146*** 0.164*** 0.172*** 0.196*** 0.239*** 0.306*** 0.253*** 0.269*** 0.256***
[0.0115] [0.0118] [0.0104] [0.00997] [0.00860] [0.0101] [0.0116] [0.0116] [0.0119] [0.0126]
Technical school 0.0683*** 0.0821*** 0.122*** 0.125*** 0.128*** 0.149*** 0.192*** 0.164*** 0.170*** 0.152***
[0.0130] [0.0139] [0.0120] [0.0116] [0.0103] [0.0121] [0.0141] [0.0143] [0.0146] [0.0159]
Senior high school 0.0210** 0.016 0.0146 0.0413*** 0.0470*** 0.0698*** 0.0889*** 0.0678*** 0.0834*** 0.0895***
[0.0103] [0.0108] [0.00955] [0.00945] [0.00856] [0.0101] [0.0119] [0.0117] [0.0119] [0.0126]
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7729 6941 7317 7435 9648 9288 9254 9170 9220 9184
R‐squared 0.35 0.33 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.32
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Experience 11‐20 years 0.275*** 0.251*** 0.278*** 0.278*** 0.254*** 0.292*** 0.308*** 0.268*** 0.288*** 0.281***
[0.0155] [0.0162] [0.0171] [0.0181] [0.0110] [0.0113] [0.0108] [0.0106] [0.0107] [0.0111]
Experience 21‐30 years 0.397*** 0.362*** 0.386*** 0.383*** 0.328*** 0.352*** 0.343*** 0.317*** 0.325*** 0.342***
[0 [0.0151] 0151] [0.0158 [0.0158] [0.01 [0 0167] 67] [0 [0.0175] 0175] [0.0107 [0.0107] [0.01 [0 0109] 09] [0 [0.0105] [0.0104] [0.0106] [0.0109] 0105] [0.0104] [0.0106] [0.0109]
Experience >30 years 0.459*** 0.420*** 0.437*** 0.411*** 0.387*** 0.403*** 0.391*** 0.343*** 0.339*** 0.345***
[0.0185] [0.0180] [0.0188] [0.0190] [0.0120] [0.0121] [0.0117] [0.0117] [0.0115] [0.0116]
College 0.324*** 0.387*** 0.448*** 0.462*** 0.486*** 0.521*** 0.522*** 0.534*** 0.511*** 0.555***
[0.0133] [0.0136] [0.0149] [0.0151] [0.00938] [0.00964] [0.00920] [0.00923] [0.00922] [0.00950]
Technical school 0.189*** 0.236*** 0.276*** 0.249*** 0.255*** 0.274*** 0.276*** 0.270*** 0.266*** 0.274***
[0.0166] [0.0172] [0.0194] [0.0196] [0.0121] [0.0125] [0.0120] [0.0124] [0.0124] [0.0130]
Senior high school 0.104*** 0.142*** 0.144*** 0.179*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.163*** 0.171*** 0.151*** 0.170***
[0.0134] [0.0139] [0.0155] [0.0154] [0.00999] [0.0102] [0.00986] [0.0101] [0.0100] [0.0103]
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9002 8861 8662 8490 20926 23667 25002 25878 26149 24240
R‐squared 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.26
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Selected regression results from the extended model, 1988‐2007
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
State sector employment 0.125*** 0.018 0.043 0.162*** ‐0.070** ‐0.137*** ‐0.110*** ‐0.081*** ‐0.095*** ‐0.090***
[0.0336] [0.0343] [0.0341] [0.0352] [0.0293] [0.0291] [0.0259] [0.0257] [0.0241] [0.0216]
Experience 11‐20 years 0.360*** 0.346*** 0.360*** 0.284*** 0.269*** 0.290*** 0.272*** 0.280*** 0.283*** 0.267***
[0.0109] [0.0119] [0.0109] [0.0106] [0.00951] [0.0114] [0.0128] [0.0131] [0.0136] [0.0146]
Experience 21‐30 years 0.480*** 0.467*** 0.493*** 0.419*** 0.404*** 0.440*** 0.443*** 0.418*** 0.409*** 0.395***
[0.0118] [0.0124] [0.0110] [0.0108] [0.00950] [0.0112] [0.0130] [0.0132] [0.0135] [0.0143]
Experience >30 years 0.546*** 0.539*** 0.577*** 0.495*** 0.477*** 0.500*** 0.511*** 0.488*** 0.496*** 0.458***
[0.0130] [0.0135] [0.0121] [0.0123] [0.0110] [0.0131] [0.0153] [0.0153] [0.0158] [0.0171]
College 0.124*** 0.146*** 0.163*** 0.169*** 0.197*** 0.241*** 0.308*** 0.256*** 0.272*** 0.261***
[0.0115] [0.0118] [0.0104] [0.00998] [0.00860] [0.0101] [0.0116] [0.0116] [0.0119] [0.0126]
Technical school 0.0659*** 0.0818*** 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.128*** 0.151*** 0.194*** 0.166*** 0.173*** 0.157***
[0.0130] [0.0139] [0.0121] [0.0116] [0.0103] [0.0121] [0.0141] [0.0143] [0.0146] [0.0159]
Senior high school 0.0187* 0.0157 0.0141 0.0390*** 0.0473*** 0.0707*** 0.0890*** 0.0687*** 0.0844*** 0.0918***
[0.0103] [0.0108] [0.00955] [0.00945] [0.00856] [0.0101] [0.0119] [0.0117] [0.0119] [0.0126]
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7729 6941 7317 7435 9648 9288 9254 9170 9220 9184
R‐squared 0.347 0.33 0.387 0.377 0.383 0.373 0.361 0.335 0.334 0.317
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
State sector employment ‐0.005 0.006 ‐0.007 0.045*** 0.143*** 0.180*** 0.204*** 0.227*** 0.205*** 0.198***
[0.02 [0 0206] 06] [0 [0.0184] 0184] [0.0174] [0.0174] [0.0168 [0.0168] ] [0.009 [0 00913] 13] [0.0 [0 0895] 00895] 0.00814] [0.00814] [0.00789] [0.00768] [0.00774] [0.00789] [0.00768] [0.00774]
Experience 11‐20 years 0.275*** 0.251*** 0.279*** 0.272*** 0.239*** 0.270*** 0.281*** 0.238*** 0.264*** 0.256***
[0.0156] [0.0162] [0.0172] [0.0182] [0.0109] [0.0112] [0.0108] [0.0105] [0.0106] [0.0110]
Experience 21‐30 years 0.398*** 0.361*** 0.387*** 0.374*** 0.306*** 0.322*** 0.305*** 0.271*** 0.289*** 0.301***
[0.0152] [0.0159] [0.0169] [0.0178] [0.0107] [0.0110] [0.0105] [0.0104] [0.0105] [0.0109]
Experience >30 years 0.460*** 0.419*** 0.438*** 0.402*** 0.353*** 0.357*** 0.338*** 0.278*** 0.284*** 0.291***
[0.0185] [0.0182] [0.0191] [0.0193] [0.0121] [0.0122] [0.0117] [0.0117] [0.0116] [0.0117]
College 0.324*** 0.386*** 0.449*** 0.455*** 0.451*** 0.474*** 0.469*** 0.463*** 0.445*** 0.487***
[0.0134] [0.0138] [0.0151] [0.0154] [0.00958] [0.00983] [0.00933] [0.00941] [0.00943] [0.00975]
Technical school 0.189*** 0.235*** 0.277*** 0.244*** 0.233*** 0.240*** 0.239*** 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.235***
[0.0166] [0.0173] [0.0196] [0.0197] [0.0122] [0.0125] [0.0120] [0.0123] [0.0123] [0.0129]
Senior high school 0.104*** 0.142*** 0.144*** 0.177*** 0.149*** 0.143*** 0.144*** 0.150*** 0.130*** 0.147***
[0.0134] [0.0139] [0.0155] [0.0154] [0.00997] [0.0102] [0.00977] [0.00996] [0.00994] [0.0102]
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9002 8861 8662 8490 20926 23667 25002 25878 26149 24240





2007‐1988 1992‐1988 1998‐1992 2003‐1998
Basic model, 1988 as the base year Mean % Mean % Mean % Mean % Mean %
Total actual difference 0.204 ‐‐ ‐0.026 ‐‐ 0.158 ‐‐ 0.076 ‐‐ ‐0.004 ‐‐
Observable price difference 0.046 23% 0.004 ‐14% 0.037 23% 0.004 5% 0.002 ‐40%
Composition ‐0.027 ‐13% ‐0.014 55% ‐0.019 ‐12% ‐0.009 ‐12% 0.015 ‐328%
Within variance 0.185 91% ‐0.015 60% 0.140 88% 0.081 107% ‐0.021 468%
Basic model, 2007 as base year
Observable price difference 0.031 15% ‐0.005 20% 0.037 24% 0.002 3% ‐0.003 68%
Composition ‐0.008 ‐4% 0.002 ‐7% ‐0.005 ‐3% ‐0.007 ‐10% 0.002 ‐55%
Within variance 0.180 88% ‐0.022 87% 0.125 79% 0.081 107% ‐0.004 87%
Extended model, 2007 as base year
Observable price difference 0.026 12% ‐0.004 15% 0.034 21% ‐0.003 ‐4% ‐0.005 111%
Composition 0.047 23% 0.048 ‐185% 0.006 4% 0.038 51% 0.021 ‐473%
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Appendix A: Simulation results 
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